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Articles

"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"?
BUSHv. GORE AND LAURENCE TRIBE'S
HALL OF MIRRORS
Nelson Lund*
Almost every lawyer with litigation experience, even if only
in law school moot court exercises, has experienced what might
be called "acquired conviction syndrome." Having taken on a
client's cause, and worked hard to develop the best arguments in
support of that cause, one often finds oneself increasingly persuaded that the weight of the arguments supports the client's position. This can easily happen even if one began by thinking that
the case was almost certainly a loser. The prevalence of acquired
conviction syndrome provides a good reason for the custom of
disclosing one's own involvement in cases on which one later offers academic commentary. This custom certainly doesn't imply
that such commentary deserves to be dismissed, or even depreciated, but it does alert the reader to the advisability of assessing
the work with a little extra caution.
A very lengthy essay by Laurence H. Tribe-eroG v. hsuB
and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors1- reaches the following considered conclusion about the
Court's holding in that case: "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY
ASS! "2 Notwithstanding Professor Tribe's vulgar expression of
* Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment
and Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University. For helpful comments,
thanks to Stephen G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, and Michael Stokes
Paulsen. Financial assistance was provided by the Law and Economics Center at George
Mason University School of Law.
!. 115 Harv. L. Rev.170 (2001).
2. In December of 2000, soon after the Supreme Court announced its decision, some Democratic voters in Florida began replacing their red-white-andblue Gore-Lieberman buttons with black buttons with white lettering stating
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contempt for the Court, his essay is extremely sophisticated. It
deserves to be read carefully, though with due regard for the fact
that he was deeply involved, as one of Gore's lawyers, in the litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore. Professor Tribe recognizes this, of course, and rightly
says of his effort to offer a "more balanced" account than others
have provided that "the proof of that pudding will have to be in
the eating." 3 My own comments-which will be a great deal
more concise,4 and less autobiographical5 -should also be read
with caution. Although I was not directly involved in the litigation, I published several short pieces about the Florida election
dispute while it was going on, and immediately after it was resolved.6 And I wanted Bush to become President, perhaps almost as much as Professor Tribe wanted Gore to win.
Much of Professor Tribe's essay is taken up with responses
to other commentators, analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence, and other matters that are peripheral to the central
question of the legal merits of the Court's decision and opinion.
Much of this extra material is quite unexceptionable, but its
daunting volume and dazzling intricacy may easily distract the
simply: "Equal Protection, My Ass!" This outburst has intuitive appeal, capturing the "where the hell did that come from?" reaction of many voters, lawyers,
and academics who read the opinion ....
. . . . We have returned to where we started: with a group of disillusioned Florida voters unconvinced by the Court's equal protection
rationale in any of its guises. And we're left with a badge that rightly
proclaims: "EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"
Id. at 221-22, 247 (emphasis added, all caps in original). The passage referred to by ellipsis in this quotation, which is part of a subsection entitled "Speaking Theoretically-The
Constitutional Shell Game," contains a lengthy discussion of three types of constitutional
analysis that might be thought to justify the outcome in the case. Lest one wonder
whether Professor Tribe endorsed the slogan on the badge when he wrote that the badge
"rightly proclaims" that slogan, consider another of Professor Tribe's summaries of his
conclusion:
Mesmerized by the Court's prestidigitation, voters might miss the fact that
the pea has already been palmed: there is no hidden constitutional reason to
uncover. None of these shells contains a defensible rationale, but each is sufficiently distracting to leave at least some observers thinking that there must be
something valid hidden there.
Id. at 222 (emphasis in original).
3. Id. at 178-79.
4. Professor Tribe's article is 133 pages long, and it includes 533 footnotes.
5. See, e.g., Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 172 n.t, 182-83,277 n.433, 301-302 (cited in
note 1).
6. An Act of Courage, The Weekly Standard 19 (Dec. 25, 2000); Travesty in Tallahassee, The Weekly Standard 17 (Dec. 18, 2000); Supreme Court's Not the Last Word,
New York Post 31 (Dec. 4, 2000); Courts Don't Own the Law, New York Post 29 (Nov.
20, 2000). I subsequently published a detailed defense of the Court's decision in the case:
The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1219 (2002).

2002]

"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"?

545

reader's eye from the absence of any solid arguments that can
support Professor Tribe's two principal conclusions about the
decision in Bush v. Gore. Those two conclusions can be stated
very simply: the Court's equal protection ruling was untenable as
a matter of law, and the case in any event was technically nonjusticiable.7 And on the basis of these conclusions, Professor Tribe
renders this further verdict: the five "Justices in the Bush v. Gore
majority have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner
in the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this republic. " 8
Those conclusions are genuinely indefensible, and Professor
Tribe is forced to rely entirely on sleights of hand in order to
make them look like the results of a detached and sober analysis.
The following commentary will show why Professor Tribe's brief
against the Court will not withstand disinterested scrutiny.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRECEDENT

As everyone knows, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore came at the end of a complex and multifaceted process
of legal and political maneuvering, much of which involved the
intricacies of Florida election law. In order to understand the
Court's ruling, however, one can get by with only the briefest
summary of the background. 9
After the initial count of the ballots, which had Bush ahead
by a small margin, and an automatic recount authorized by state
law, which also gave Bush a small lead, Gore asked for additional recounts by local election officials in four heavily Democratic counties. Overruling Florida's Secretary of State, the Flor-

7. One other point deserves a brief mention. Professor Tribe appears to contend
(as many other commentators have contended), that the Supreme Court forbade the
Florida court from ordering a new recount on remand. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 263
(cited in note 1) ("The Court's only justification for ending the recount, rather than at
least allowing the Florida Supreme Court to try to fashion a remedy for the supposed
defects in its December 8 order .... "); see also id. at 268 (referring to the Court's "dcci·
sian to toss out all the remaining legal votes as of 10 p.m. on December 12, 2000"). For
reasons that I have explained elsewhere, this is a demonstrably incorrect interpretation
of the Court's opinion. Lund, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1270-78 (cited in note 6). To their
credit, some of Gore's other lawyers have refrained from endorsing this misreading of
Bush v. Gore. See id. at 1277 n.185 (discussing public statements of David Boies and
Ronald Klain).
8. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 290 (cited in note 1).
9. For a more detailed discussion of the factual and legal background, see Lund,
23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1224-43 (cited in note 6).
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ida Supreme Court granted an extension of time for these recounts to be conducted, but two of the counties failed to meet
the new, court-ordered deadline. The Secretary of State then declared Bush the winner of Florida's electoral votes, and Gore
filed a lawsuit making a number of demands, all of which were
rejected by the trial court. Three of those demands, however,
were ultimately granted by a 4-3 vote of the Florida Supreme
Court, which ordered the trial court to take the following steps:
•
Add a net of 215 votes (or perhaps 176, depending on a factual issue that the appellate judges did not resolve) to
Gore's total, based on the Palm Beach County recount,
whose results were not reported to the Secretary of State
before the court-ordered deadline.
•
Add a net of 168 votes for Gore to the vote totals, based on
an uncompleted recount conducted in Miami-Dade County
that had begun with the more heavily Democratic precincts
in that jurisdiction.
•
Conduct a manual recount of 9,000 Miami-Dade "undervote" ballots, which Gore claimed might shift the statewide
totals in his favor. 10
The Florida Supreme Court also ordered the trial court to take
one more step, which Gore had not requested:
•
Conduct a statewide recount of some kind, which the Florida Supreme Court strongly suggested should be limited to a
recount of the "undervote" ballots in each county. 11
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Florida court, holding
that this four-part order (whatever its merits may have been as
an interpretation of state law) violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Without concluding that any one element was constitutionally fatal, the Court held that the combination of the following facts prevented the order from satisfying "the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to
secure the fundamental right" to vote. 12
10. "Undervotes" are ballots on which a counter did not detect any choice for the
office of President. Similarly, "overvotes" are ballots on which a counter detected more
than one choice for President and thus registered no vote.
II. Technically, the Florida Supreme Court only required the trial court to consider
conducting a statewide recount, perhaps because of doubts about the supreme court's
jurisdiction to order the recount. The trial court did begin doing exactly what the supreme court had suggested that it do, and it has become customary to treat the supreme
court's suggestion as if it had been an order. Little, if anything, turns on the distinction
now.
12. 531 U.S. at 105.

2002]

"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"?

547

•

Varying standards for determining a voter's intent had been
employed by the counties in which manual recounts had
been held, and at least one county changed its standard repeatedly during the recount.
•
Unlike the recounts in the Gore-selected counties, which
had included all ballots, the statewide recount was limited
to "undervotes," and did not even include the analytically
indistinguishable "overvote" ballots.
•
Partial results from the uncompleted recount in MiamiDade had been used to credit one candidate with additional
votes, and the Florida court evidently contemplated the future use of partial recounts.
•
The statewide recount was being conducted by untrained
personnel, unguided by objective standards for identifying
legal votes, and observers were not permitted to make contemporaneous objections.
The Court relied for its decision primarily upon Reynolds v.
Sims 13 and related decisions, including Gray v. Sanders 14 and
Moore v. Ogilvie. 15 The essence of the Court's argument was that
these vote-dilution cases prohibit a state from arbitrarily treating
ballots differently depending on where they are cast. Acknowledging that it is impossible to treat every ballot or every voter
absolutely identically in all respects, the Court concluded that
the recount ordered by the Florida court was permeated with
avoidable and unjustified nonuniformity, in violation of the principles established by Reynolds. 16
In an uncharacteristically terse discussion, Professor Tribe
dismisses these precedents by distinguishing them on their
facts. 17 And he concludes his discussion of equal protection theory and doctrine by endorsing the conclusion set forth on badges
13. 377 u.s. 533 (1964).
14. 372 u.s. 368 (1963).
15. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
16. Professor Tribe mistakenly believes that the Court also held that the Florida
court's order violated due process. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 177, 219, 233-34 (cited in
note 1). In fact, the Supreme Court's holding was based exclusively on equal protection.
See 531 U.S. at 103 ("[W]e find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."). The
Court's only comment on due process came when it remarked that "it is obvious that the
recount [initiated by the Florida court] cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work."Id.
at 110. Due process would, for example, require "orderly judicial review of any disputed
matters that might arise." Id. This does not imply, or even suggest, that the Florida court
had already violated due process.
I 7. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 222-26 (cited in note 1).
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that some outraged Gore supporters began wearing after the decision: "EQUAL PROTECfiON, MY ASS!" 18 This formulation
is somewhat jarring in a piece that purports to offer a "balanced"
and "measured" assessment of the Court's work, 19 which he
elsewhere indicates has left him with "a sad lump in the throat
that will, stubbornly, never go away." 20
More important, expressions either of contempt or of
deeply felt grief are pretty hard to reconcile with Professor
Tribe's later acknowledgment that Justices Souter and Breyer,
who also concluded that the Equal Protection Clause had been
violated, would not have been likely to accept a transparently
untenable legal theory.Z 1 Professor Tribe might also have noted,
though he does not, that three Democrats dissented from the
Florida Supreme Court's decision, in part for the same reasons
adopted by seven members of the U.S. Supreme Court. 22 As we
shall see, it is no coincidence that such a wide spectrum of judges
all agreed that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.
The cute vulgarity on the Gore supporters' buttons will not
withstand scrutiny. Neither will the reference to a Hall of Mirrors in the title of Professor Tribe's essay. The real Hall of Mirrors is the one he himself has constructed.
A. THE LAW THAT APPLIED IN BUSHV. GORE

Perhaps it is best to begin by asking what the Gore supporters who came up with the slogan "EQUAL PROTECfiON, MY
ASS!" might have meant. For people who are generally familiar
with the Court's work, but not immersed in the intricacies of
equal protection case law, the Court's decision might well have
seemed quite startling, and transparently dishonest. In many
cases over the past quarter century or so, the Court has insisted
that a plaintiff must show more than unequal effects: discriminatory purpose is ordinarily a necessary element of an equal protection claim.Z 3 The Court, including the five members of the
Bush v. Gore majority, has been insistent about policing this
limit on the reach of equal protection analysis, which has been
18. See note 2.
19. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 178-79 (cited in note 1).
20. Id. at 302.
21. See id. at 292-93.
22. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting), 1272 (Harding, J.,
dissenting) (Fla. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
23. E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426
u.s. 229 (1976).
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applied, for example, in cases involving claims of racial votedilution.24 Nor have the most conservative Justices shown much
willingness to expand the reach of equal protection doctrine into
new areas? 5 One possible exception-a telling exception for
many observers-has been in the field of affirmative action,
where the more conservative Justices have pushed to protect the
victims of so-called reverse discrimination. 2
In Bush v. Gore, the Court demanded no showing of discriminatory purpose or intent. Nor did the Court identify any
"suspect class" or "discrete and insular minority" whose interests
were threatened by a politically powerful majority. So it may
have looked rather obviously as though a sudden and unexplained equal protection innovation had magically emerged from
just those Justices usually most averse to such judicial activism.
And just in time to rescue a Republican presidential candidate
who had promised to appoint more Justices who would be reluctant to overturn the legal precedents that these same Justices
had devoted their careers to establishing.
Plausible as this story might sound, and I don't doubt that
many sincere supporters of Vice President Gore must have believed it, it is based on a very simple mistake. The cases that call
this story forth all belong to the branch of equal protection case
law that deals with so-called suspect classifications, such as race.
But these "suspect classification" cases-including those dealing
with racial vote dilution- have almost nothing to do with Bush
v. Gore, which is part of a completely different line of cases usually referred to as the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection law.
The anomalies that leap out when Bush v. Gore is compared
with "suspect classification" cases disappear once one recognizes
that this was a "fundamental rights" case. First, this latter line of
cases deals mainly with voting rights, which is exactly what was
involved in Bush v. Gore. So there was no striking innovation of
24. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
25. Sec, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (state constitutional provision
prohibiting certain kinds of special legal protections for homosexuals held unconstitutional). Justice Scalia's dissent in this case was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
26. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiza, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), where the same
five Justices who formed the majority in Bush v. Gore overruled a recent affirmativeaction precedent, and remanded the case with instructions to apply strict scrutiny to a
federal program involving set-asides for minority contractors. Cf. Tribe, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. at 251 (cited in note 1) (mistakenly asserting that the Court "struck down a government set-aside" in this case).
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the kind that the Court's more conservative members have resisted when other members of the Court have wanted to expand
the list of "suspect classifications." Second, the Court has never
required a showing of discriminatory purpose in fundamentalrights cases. It certainly would have been a major innovation if
this requirement had been dropped or ignored in a suspectclassification case, but there is not and never has been any such
requirement in fundamental-rights cases.
The Gore supporters who came up with the protest button
may not have known about the difference between suspectclassification cases and fundamental-rights cases. Professor
Tribe, however, has probably forgotten more about these cases
than most people will ever know. Unfortunately, as we shall see,
his analysis in this article fails to take account of some significant
points about these cases.
Before we get to that, let's consider Professor Tribe's principal attack on the Court's legal analysis. Recognizing that the
Court relied primarily on Reynolds v. Sims and related cases,
Professor Tribe attempts to distinguish those cases from Bush v.
Gore. As every lawyer knows, any case can be distinguished
from any other case "on the facts," sometimes legitimately and
sometimes not. The distinctions on which Professor Tribe relies
are not legitimate, and they are such that even he does not consistently adhere to them.
The facts in Reynolds v. Sims are well known. A number of
state legislatures had failed to reapportion the districts for state
legislative seats after population shifts had made some of those
districts much more populous than others. Professor Tribe dismisses the relevance of this case because "Florida's at-large
scheme in no way implicated the Reynolds skewed district concern."27
Two other cases cited by the Court in Bush v. Gore receive
similarly dismissive treatment. Gray v. Sanders held that statewide elections may not be conducted under a system resembling
the federal electoral college, and Moore v. Ogilvie that a state
may not require that a nominating petition for presidential elector include the signatures of at least 200 qualified voters from
each of at least 50 counties. Professor Tribe dismisses these
precedents because they are "immediately distinguishable on the
ground that each case involved a plan implemented by the state

27.

Tribe, llS Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1).
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legislature that clearly had the purpose and effect of granting
greater voting power to a particular class-in both cases, rural
voters. " 28
Are these distinctions legitimate or illegitimate? It is true
that the technical holding in Reynolds was only that state legislative seats must be apportioned on an equipopulation basis. And
the holdings in Gray and Moore are similarly limited to the specific schemes at issue in those cases. But Chief Justice Warren's
opinion in Reynolds also articulated the broader principle on
which that decision was based: "[T]he right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's
vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise
of the franchise .... Weighting the votes of citizens differently,
by any method or means, merely because of where they happen
to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that
the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simpleminded
modes of discrimination. "' 29
Contrary to Professor Tribe's suggestion, the Court has not
limited the Reynolds principles to cases involving "skewed districts."30 Nor has the Court limited the reach of those principles
to schemes "that clearly had the purpose and effect of granting
greater voting power to a particular class." 31 Consider, for example, O'Brien v. Skinner. 32 In this case, state law permitted absentee voting only by those who were absent from their county of
residence on election day. When applied to persons in jail, it had
the odd and presumably unforeseen effect of discriminating between those who were jailed in their county of residence and
those who were jailed elsewhere. Although this was a votedenial case, to which Reynolds' vote-dilution holding was not directly applicable, the Court held that the statute violated equal
protection without even suggesting that the absence of a legislative purpose to increase the voting power of a particular class
was relevant. Similarly, Reynolds and other opinions have condemned a variety of vote-dilution practices that have nothing to
do with "skewed districts," such as altering ballots and stuffing
the ballot box. 33
28. Id. at 225.
29. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555,563 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
30. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1).
31. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
32. 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; Anderson v. United Stales, 417 U.S. 211, 227
(1974); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208
(1962).
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The principle actually underlying Reynolds and related
cases is not a concern with "skewed districts," but rather with
"any method or means" of weighting votes differently depending
on where voters reside. The recount scheme devised by the Florida Supreme Court was unique in history, so of course there
could be no legal precedent exactly on point. But Florida voters
were certainly treated differently depending on where they lived.
Most obviously, voters who had their "overvote" ballots manually reexamined in the four counties that Gore selected for hand
recounts were more likely to have their votes count than those
who cast similar ballots elsewhere. Similarly, voters who cast
"dimpled chad" ballots in Broward County were treated differently than those who cast similar ballots in Palm Beach. Voters
living in the unrecounted (and more Republican) precincts of
Miami-Dade did not have their ballots manually reexamined,
while those living in the recounted (and more Democratic) precincts did. The differential treatment of voters by the Florida
court may seem arbitrary in a way that a settled plan to disadvantage rural voters does not, but the Court has never held that
such a settled plan is a necessary element of an equal protection
violation, and O'Brien illustrates that even inadvertently arbitrary voting schemes can violate the Constitution.
The differences in the way Florida voters were treated,
moreover, were not randomly arbitrary. The Florida court
largely accepted one litigant's self-serving requests in a particular election, and it did so at a time when any recount could help
only that particular candidate (because his opponent had already
been certified as the winner of the election by Florida's Secretary of State). Even if one assumes that the Florida court's extraordinary order was authorized by state law, the absence of a
settled legislative plan to disadvantage a durable interest group
like urban voters can hardly serve to take the case outside Reynolds' admonition against "sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination." If it could, Reynolds' express
condemnation of stuffed ballot boxes (a practice that has probably never been part of a settled legislative plan) would be nonsensical.
It is true, of course, that Reynolds never said that the treatment of voters must be perfectly equae4 That would be impossi34. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 ("We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or
citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.") (footnote omitted)).
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ble, and the Court has, for example, permitted a variety of deviations from the equipopulation requirement for legislative districts.35 But it is also true that Reynolds must be read to cover
some situations on which the Court has not already precisely
ruled, including cases that fall outside the "skewed district" rubric. And Professor Tribe himself later admits that this is true:
"No one doubts that the Reynolds line would prevent a state
from adopting a system in which those who tally machinerejected ballots manually are instructed to toss out ballots with
ambiguous marks indicating an intent to vote for Bush but to
count all the votes for Gore. "36
The Supreme Court concluded that the facts in Bush v.
Gore are more like this hypothetical than like the innumerable
situations in which minor or unavoidable deviations from perfect
equality are permissible. The nature of the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence has produced a huge range of
cases in which a decision either way would be neither indisputably correct nor impossible to defend. Bush v. Gore falls within
that range, though the Court's holding is extremely easy to defend. Even granting that it may not be absolutely unchallengeable, Professor Tribe's attempt to dismiss the Court's conclusion
as untenable is itself untenable.
Implicitly abandoning his "skewed district" explanation for
Reynolds, Professor Tribe reframes the Court's prohibition
against "sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination" as an affirmative requirement that "the method of
counting [be] fair." 37 Professor Tribe then asserts that the procedures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court "certainly passed
35. Similarly, the Court has not used Reynolds to condemn all forms of gerrymandering, which certainly do entail "sophisticated modes of discrimination." See Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Professor Tribe invokes this case for the proposition that
the Court has permitted "just the sort of partisan politicking the Bush Court seemingly
wanted to exclude." Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1). Unfortunately for
that argument, there was no majority opinion in Davis, and the result in the case might
well be explained by an implicit recognition of the impossibility of identifying "ungerrymandered" apportionment schemes that would pass constitutional muster if gerrymandering were outlawed. Cf. 478 U.S. at 144-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that if the principle underlying the plurality's "nebulous standard" for evaluating partisan gerrymanders were taken seriously, it would lead to the abolition of districtbased representation in favor of a proportional representation system).
36. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 224 (cited in note 1). See also id. at 222 n.195 ("Even
under traditional doctrines, counting the ballots of Palm Beach County twice and those
of Broward County just once, for instance-giving Palm Beach voters twice as much influence on the outcome as Broward voters-would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.").
37. ld. at 224.
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this test." 38 The principal basis for this startling conclusion is that
" [n]othing in the record indicated that the Florida Legislature,
the state judiciary, or the county recount teams intended to discriminate against any class, suspect or otherwise ... " 39
First, Professor Tribe is once again wrong to assume that intentional discrimination is a necessary element of an equal protection claim under the voting rights branch of equal protection
doctrine. O'Brien vividly illustrates the absence of such a requirement, and Professor Tribe cites no case in which the Court
has rejected such a claim for failure to prove discriminatory intent. It is quite true that nobody proved that the four judges in
the Florida Supreme Court majority had acted with the discriminatory intent that is required in cases arising under the suspectclass branch of equal protection doctrine. It is also quite irrelevant.
Furthermore, assuming that we should accept Professor
Tribe's characterization of Reynolds' rationale as a "fairness" rationale, can one really maintain with a straight face that all of the
elements of the Florida court's order were fair? Consider some
examples of how Professor Tribe attempts to do so.
Miami-Dade had begun its recount with more heavily Democratic precincts and never got around to recounting more Republican precincts.40 Notwithstanding this obvious partisan bias,
the Florida court ordered that Gore be credited with all the
votes that he picked up in this partial recount, and did not require that the recount be completed. Professor Tribe defends
this bizarre ruling because of the incentive effects it supposedly
creates:
[A] rule that permits inclusion of all legal votes identified
through the preliminary manual recount, and only those
votes, encourages each candidate to mobilize the county canvassing boards to count all votes in the precincts that the candidate deems most favorable. Including partial results thereby
increases the likelihood that complete results will be obtained,
a fact that a backward looking analysis, taking the U.S. Su41
preme Court's later intervention for granted, neglects.

38. Id
39. Id. at 225-26.
40. See Trial Transcript, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Leon Cty. Jud. Cir. Dec. 2,
2000) at 461-83 (unrebutted testimony of Thomas Spencer) (transcript available at
<http://election2000.stanford.edu> ).
41. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 215-16 (cited in note 1) (emphasis in original).
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A "backward looking" analysis, however, is exactly what the
Florida court adopted, for no one had ever imagined such a rule
until Gore asked the Florida courts to invent the rule and apply
it retroactively. 42 So here is Professor Tribe's concept of "fairness": In response to a Democratic candidate's demand for arecount in a heavily Democratic county, a canvassing board dominated by Democrats elected in partisan elections begins
recounting the more heavily Democratic precincts, and does not
recount the ballots in more Republican precincts. And it is "fair"
for a court to give the Democratic candidate the benefit of this
partial recount, thereby possibly changing the result of an election for President of the United States, in order to encourage future candidates in future elections in Florida to "mobilize" local
officials of their opponents' party to comply expeditiously with
demands made by the candidates' opponents. No disinterested
commentator could possibly call this "fair."
Even the Florida court's majority recognized the gross unfairness of conducting a recount of just those jurisdictions chosen
by one of the candidates and his partisan allies, which is why
these judges directed, sua sponte, that some kind of statewide recount be initiated. And when the United States Supreme Court
also acknowledges the patently discriminatory nature of the Miami-Dade partial recount, can one really respond by saying
"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? This is not the balanced
and measured analysis that Professor Tribe promised at the outset of his essay, and I do not believe that it reflects a notion of
"fairness" that deserves the name.
Consider next the Florida court's decision to overlay a selective statewide reexamination of "undervote" ballots after accepting a recount of all ballots in certain counties (and parts of
certain other counties) selected by Gore and his fellow Democrats. The Supreme Court concisely explained why there is a
"fairness" problem with this procedure:
A manual recount of all ballots identifies not only those ballots which show no vote but also those which contain more
than one, the so-called overvotes. Neither category will be
counted by the machine. This is not a trivial concern. At oral
42. The novelty of the Florida court's recount order is indisputable, for nothing like
this had ever been done in Florida. That point is quite separate from the question
whether the novel recount order was based on a defensible interpretation of the Florida
statutes. I do not believe that it was, see Lund, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1235-43 (cited in
note 6), but the equal protection problems with the recount order would be the same
whether or not the order was based on a correct interpretation of the Florida statutes.
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argument, respondents estimated there are as many as
110,000 overvotes statewide. As a result, the citizen whose
ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote for
a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still have his
vote counted in a manual recount; on the other hand, the citizen who marks two candidates in a way discernible by the machine will not have the same opportunity to have his vote
count, even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the requisite indicia of intent. Furthermore, the citizen
who marks two candidates, only one of which is discernible by
the machine, will have his vote counted even though it should
have been read as an invalid ballot. 43

So far as I can see, Professor Tribe offers no "fairness" rationale
at all for limiting the statewide recount to undervote ballots, and
no response at all to the Supreme Court's analysis. 44
If a rule limiting recounts to "undervote" ballots had been
adopted in advance of the election, when nobody could know
which candidate would be helped by it, one might try to defend
it as a harmlessly arbitrary rule. But that is not at all what happened here. Whether or not the Florida statutes could be interpreted to authorize the Florida courts to invent rules like this
one, it was a completely novel procedure invented for the occasion by the Florida court. Even if we assume that Bush and Gore
were equally likely to pick up votes in a recount of undervote
ballots, Bush had already come out ahead in the machine counts,
so the rule could only benefit Gore. And, for the reasons given
by the Supreme Court, one could not maintain with a straight
face that the arbitrarily limited recount ordered by the Florida
court would provide a more accurate determination of which
candidate received more votes in Florida.
B. WAS THE LAW APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT
SENSELESS?

This comparison between the accuracy of the machine count
and of the recount ordered by the Florida court brings us to Professor Tribe's deepest, and most deeply misleading, criticisms of
43. 531 U.S. at 107-08.
44. Professor Tribe misleadingly points out that preexisting Florida law did not
permit the counting of overvotes. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 237 & n.267 (cited in note
1). Florida law did treat ballots containing votes for more than one candidate as invalid.
But the law also treated ballots containing votes for no candidate (undervotes) as invalid.
And neither fact has anything to do with the issue in the case, which was whether certain
ballots would be reexamined to see whether the counting machines had or had not classified them according to the applicable legal standard.
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Bush v. Gore's equal protection analysis. The essence of that
criticism begins with the proposition that every mode of counting
ballots contains biases and inaccuracies of various kinds, which
implies that there are many defensible ways of conducting an
election, none of which can be said to be inherently superior to
the others. Professor Tribe argues that the machine recounts and
the recount ordered by the Florida court were both within an acceptable range of imperfection, and that the Supreme Court
therefore could have no principled basis for choosing one over
the other:
[N)o uniform set of statewide counting standards could begin
to account for all the differences in the design and thickness
of ballots; in the form and maintenance of tabulation equipment; and in the age, political leanings, and other demographic characteristics of distinct areas yielding errors of either false exclusion or false inclusion (including its most
extreme variant, false reversal). No uniform set of standards
can in the end minimize the aggregate number of errors or
come any closer to approximating what the Court deemed the
45
applicable ideal of "one person, one vote."

Analytically, there actually is something to this argument. In an
election that was this close, I agree, it really is impossible to say
that the vote totals certified by Florida's Secretary of State were
certain to be more accurate (or were demonstrably more likely
to correctly identify the winner of more votes) than whatever totals would have emerged from the recount ordered by the Florida court. 46 But that does not undermine the equal protection
analysis in Bush v. Gore, for several reasons.
First, to the extent that one takes this analysis seriously, it
implies that the Reynolds line of cases was wrongly decided.
That line of cases, it should be recalled, does not categorically
forbid vote dilution or require absolute adherence to the "one
person, one vote" ideal. Rather it subjects vote-dilution practices
to strict scrutiny. Just to take one obvious example of the difference this makes, the Court has not required districts to be appor-

45. Id. at 257.
46. Some media reports have carelessly suggested that Bush would have emerged
the winner if the recount ordered by the Florida court had been completed. In fact, however, the recount initiated by the Florida court was not proceeding according to fixed
standards, and thus there is no way to know how the innumerable questions that would
have arisen before it was finished were going to be resolved. For a useful elaboration on
this point, see Einer Elhauge, Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again!, The Weekly Standard 2931 (Nov. 26, 2001).
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tioned based on a census taken on the very day an election is
held. Similarly, to take a slightly less obvious example, the Court
has allowed apportionment to be based on total population
rather than the population of eligible voters. But the existence of
these and many other deviations from the Court's "one person,
one vote" ideal (some of which are identifiable and some of
which are presumably undiscovered) has not been taken to imply that the various forms of vote dilution that the Court has invalidated are indistinguishable from those that the Court has
permitted.
One can argue about whether the Court has drawn the lines
in appropriate places, but one cannot rely on Professor Tribe's
analytical argument without demolishing the foundations on
which the Reynolds line of cases rests: his analysis inexorably
leads to the conclusion that voting practices that result in vote
dilution should be subject only to rational-basis scrutiny. Under
rational-basis scrutiny, Reynolds itself would have been wrongly
decided, for there are a number of legitimate government purposes that can be served by malapportioned districts, as the
Court acknowledged. 47 But Professor Tribe does not repudiate
Reynolds. On the contrary, he expressly embraces what he calls
the "nurturing earth" of that decision. 48
And even if one could reinterpret Reynolds and related
cases as adopting a rational-basis standard of review, 49 one could
still not use that reinterpretation to impugn the decision in Bush
v. Gore because the Florida court's order in that case was far
more irrational than some of the malapportionment schemes
that the Court has declared unconstitutional. At least some aspects of the Florida court order at issue in Bush v. Gore were so
arbitrary that even Justices Souter and Breyer acknowledged
that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated. Neither of
the other dissenters (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) even at47. E.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579-81.
48. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 274 (cited in note 1).
49. Some of the Court's opinions, including Reynolds itself, contain isolated phrases
that suggest the use of rational-basis scrutiny. Those same cases, however, also contain
language that points toward the use of strict scrutiny, and, more important, the analysis
actually used is clearly the kind of analysis that is now conventionally called strict scrutiny. In McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), a case
relied on by Justice Ginsburg in her Bush v. Gore dissent, the Court really did sound as
though it was employing rational-basis review. But in a subsequent case, which Justice
Ginsburg tellingly did not cite, the Court dispelled that apparent implication by characterizing McDonald as a case in which no review at all was required because it was a votedenial case in which the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they were actually prohibited
from voting. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512,520-21 (1973).
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tempted to explain how the Florida court's order could be reconciled with the principles articulated in Reynolds, and Professor
Tribe never succeeds in doing so either.
Furthermore, let us assume for the sake of argument that
the counting processes that led to Bush's certification as the
winner of the election may have contained so much unjustifiable
nonuniformity that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Even
if that were true, the fact remains that nobody proved any such
thing in court. Indeed, Gore never alleged any such thing. 50 It
simply cannot be that the Supreme Court is required to conduct
an independent investigation of all of the unchallenged election
practices that a state employs before it can declare that a challenged election practice is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
certainly did not do any such thing in Reynolds, nor could it have
done so. Neither could it have done so in Bush v. Gore.
It is perfectly true that the impossibility of eliminating all
inequalities in a state's election processes means that the courts
should not jump to invalidate practices for which there are no
apparent good alternatives. Such an approach would be asinine,
and would invite a variety of opportunistic litigation strategies
by disappointed candidates and their supporters. But that is not
what happened in Bush v. Gore. There are obviously many ways
of counting ballots that do not entail anything like the arbitrary
and biased recount procedure ordered by the Florida court. A
hand recount of all the ballots in Florida is one obvious example.
The initial machine counts of the ballots is another. It simply is
not the case that the underlying count that Gore was challenging
obviously entailed anything comparable to the arbitrary and biased features that the Supreme Court found in the recount procedure that it struck down.
Finally, one should note that one of the many questionable
practices that the Reynolds Court did not examine was partisan
gerrymandering, notwithstanding the fact that much of the effect
of malapportioned districts can be reproduced through this de-

50. Professor Tribe quietly and indirectly acknowledges as much when he states
that Gore's lawyers "raised the issue of the unreliability of the underlying count" in a
footnote in a different case arising from the Florida election dispute. Tribe, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. at 260 n.371 (cited in note 1). This footnote did not really raise or argue any legal
issue at all, for it merely described how "undervote" ballots can be produced in punchcard voting systems, and noted that any votes "reflected" on such ballots would not be
counted unless a manual recount were conducted. In neither this case nor in Bush v.
Gore did Gore claim that the underlying count violated the Equal Protection Clause or
any other provision of the Constitution.
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vice. 51 Professor Tribe is quick to point out that in Davis v. Bandemer the Court was much more tolerant of such gerrymandering than of malapportionment. 52 And it is certainly true that the
Davis Court did not explain how the result in that case fit with
the principles of Reynolds. Although one wouldn't know it from
reading Professor Tribe's article, however, the Davis Court
didn't really explain much of anything because there was no majority opinion, and the concurring opinions that produced a majority for the judgment were analytically incommensurable with
each other. More fundamentally, however, Davis revealed that a
serious effort to follow Reynolds' logic in the context of partisan
gerrymandering would culminate in the replacement of districtbased representation with proportional representation. The
Reynolds Court clearly did not contemplate so monumental a restructuring of our political system, and the Justices were understandably reluctant to go down that road in Davis.
All of which tends to confirm that Justice Harlan was right
when he argued in his Reynolds dissent that this was an illconsidered decision, based on slogans rather than any analysis of
the Constitution, and adopted without an appreciation of its
radical implications. Maybe that means that Reynolds should be
overruled. Or maybe it means that the Court should expressly
limit Reynolds to its facts, and declare that its principles will not
be applied elsewhere. But what it cannot mean is what Professor
Tribe seems to conclude: that any method of counting votes is
constitutional under Reynolds if it satisfies his personal, intuitive,
and very peculiar, standards of "fairness":
Put bluntly, Reynolds clearly supports some small degree of
inaccuracy in the count so long as the method of counting is
fair, and Davis contemplates a large dollop of politics in developing the method of counting. The procedure that the
Florida Supreme Court developed to implement the enactments of the Florida Legislature-a procedure that included
representatives of the candidates and was overseen by an im53
partial magistrate-certainly passed this test.

51. The Reynolds Court did note that a state might legitimately wish to discourage
such gerrymandering, 377 U.S. at 581, but it made no effort to compare the vote-diluting
effects of gerrymandering with those of malapportionment. For a useful comparison of
the two techniques, see Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper, The Third Criterion: An Inquiry Into the Use of Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 301 (1991).
52. E.g., Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 223 (cited in note 1).
53. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
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As we have seen, Professor Tribe's idea of "fairness" is untenable. But there is a second reason why a comparison of the machine count with the court-ordered recount does not undermine
the equal protection analysis in Bush v. Gore. In a footnote to
the passage just quoted, Professor Tribe appears to suggest that
under Reynolds and Davis a counting process can be "fair" even
if the designer of the process knows the probable outcome of the
design. 54 Why? Because "apportionment is invariably designed
in full knowledge of its probable consequences." 55 But while this
is inevitably true of apportionment, it is not inevitably true of
processes for counting votes. Which, I suppose, is why Professor
Tribe concedes that counting all the ballots on which Gore's
name was marked, but not the ballots on which Bush's name was
marked, would violate Reynolds. 56
Now suppose that the Florida court had decreed that the
ballots would be counted by several different methods, all of
which were within a tolerable range of imperfection, and that
Gore would be declared the winner if he came out ahead in any
one of these various recounts. Professor Tribe would probably
concede that this was "unfair" and that it would violate Reynolds. But suppose that one candidate was declared the winner
after the ballots were counted in the usual manner (a manner
that was, so far as any court could know at the time, within a tolerable range of imperfection), and the ballots were then ordered
recounted in a novel and arbitrary way. This, of course, is Bush
v. Gore. Given that one candidate had already come out ahead
after the ballots were counted in the usual way, this could hurt
only that particular candidate, and it could help only his opponent. Notwithstanding this undeniable fact, and notwithstanding
that this fact was knowable with absolute certainty when the
novel and arbitrary recount was invented, Professor Tribe declares that this "certainly" passes a fairness test. Nothing could
be less certain.
Thus, although Professor Tribe spends many pages scrutinizing the processes that led to the certified results in the Florida
election, diligently searching for every possible example of nonuniformity in the way that ballots were counted by election offi54. Professor Tribe doesn't quite say this. Instead, he juxtaposes a statement about
the designers of apportionment with a statement about the counters of votes. But he must
be trying to defend the vote counting process designed by the Florida court, for otherwise his footnote would be pointless.
55. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 224 n.206 (cited in note 1).
56. Id. at 224.
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cials in Florida's sixty-seven counties/ 7 he ignores the most salient difference between the initial counting processes and the
court-ordered recount. Nobody knew or could even guess how
the various and uncoordinated decisions of officials in all these
counties might affect the outcome of any election, while nobody
could fail to see that the court-ordered recount could help only
one particular candidate.
Both equal protection doctrine and any disinterested concept of fairness require that the adoption of such a patently biased arrangement be subjected to close scrutiny. The Bush v.
Gore Court properly asked how this recount could be justified.
Nobody has provided any reasoned justification for it. Not the
four Florida judges who adopted it over the strong objections of
their three dissenting colleagues. Not the two dissenters in Bush
v. Gore who refused to agree with the other seven members of
the Court. And not Professor Tribe. "EQUAL PROTECTION
MY ASS!" may be an understandable expression of partisan
emotion by disappointed political activists, but it is not a slogan
that deserves to be given academic respectability.
II. THE POLITICAL DOCTRINE QUESTION
When Professor Tribe said that "Davis contemplates a large
dollop of politics in developing the method of counting," he prefigured a separate and independent objection to the decision in
Bush v. Gore. Whatever one thinks of the Court's equal protection analysis, the decision would be wrong if the case was nonjusticiable under the so-called political question doctrine. And, in
fact, Professor Tribe asserts without qualification that this was
indeed a nonjusticiable case. 58 In defending this assertion, Professor Tribe employs arguments that are even more spectacularly indefensible than those he used to attack the Court's equal
protection analysis.
Let's begin with what the Court did. As Professor Tribe correctly notes, the Court simply ignored the political question doctrine. Less correctly, he sardonically treats this as an amazingly
irresponsible suppression of an obviously relevant consideration:
How remarkable was it that neither the Court's per curiam
opinion nor the Chief Justice's concurrence so much as mentioned the political question issue, much less attempted to jus57.
58.

Id. at 254-63.
Id. at 280.
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tify its assertion of authority in the face of the seemingly applicable political question doctrine? It's hardly the sort of
thing a Supreme Court Justice simply forgets about. And even
if it were the briefs called the attention of the Justices to the
59
problem.

In a footnote appended to this passage, Professor Tribe cites two
amicus briefs. One of them made a nonjusticiability argument,
but it was filed in a different case that did not involve any equal
protection issues. 60 The other brief, which was at least filed in
Bush v. Gore, made only a passing reference to the politicalquestion doctrine, without arguing that the case was nonjusticiable. And what about the briefs that Professor Tribe himself filed
in these two cases? None of those briefs contains any mention of
nonjusticiability or of the political-question doctrine, and none
of them contains any reference to the amicus briefs to which he
now says the Court should have paid such close attention.
One might ask the same kind of sardonic questions about
Tribe the litigator that Tribe the commentator asks about the
Supreme Court. 61 But perhaps it will be more profitable to note
that the dissenters in Bush v. Gore also failed to argue that the
case was nonjusticiable, just like the Court's majority and just
like Tribe the litigator. Professor Tribe doesn't disclose this fact
about the Bush v. Gore dissenters, and indeed one might be led
to think the opposite by his comment that "Justices Breyer and
Souter held their colleagues' feet to the fire on the point." 62 But
it is true nonetheless: nobody on the Supreme Court contended
that Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion contains a lengthy argument in which he energetically contends that the Court should
have refused to decide the case on prudential grounds of judicial
restraint, but Breyer never contends that the case was nonjusticiable. And Professor Tribe's current position is emphatically
not the same as Breyer's. According to Professor Tribe:

59. Id. at 279 (footnote omitted).
60. The case was Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000),
which arose from litigation challenging the Florida Secretary of State's interpretation of
the state laws that set deadlines for counties to complete hand recounts requested by
Gore and his allies. It is worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court decided this case
unanimously, and that not a single member of the Court endorsed the nonjusticiability
argument proffered in the amicus brief, or even considered it worth mentioning.
61. As Peter Berkowitz has pointed out, in Tribe vs. Truth, The Weekly Standard
29, 33 (Feb. 4, 2002).
62. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 279-80 (cited in note 1).
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[T]he only lawful choice [for the Supreme Court], not because
of any theory of passive virtues or because the counsel of prudence so dictated, but rather because the Constitution so
commanded the Court, was not to inject itself into the dispute.63

There are two very good reasons why neither Justice Breyer, nor
any other member of the Court, nor any of the litigants, claimed
that Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable: Baker v. Carr and McPherson v. Blacker. Baker v. Carr, 64 the leading case on the politicalquestion doctrine, decided that vote-dilution claims-that is, the
very type of claim that Bush v. Gore upheld-are justiciable.
That was not necessarily dispositive in Bush v. Gore because
Baker did not involve a presidential election, but McPherson v.
Blacker was indeed dispositive. That case raised several questions under Article II, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Electoral Count Act, and the Court held as follows:
It is argued that the subject-matter of the controversy is not
of judicial cognizance, because it is said that all questions
connected with the election of a presidential elector are political in their nature; that the court has no power finally to
dispose of them; and that its decision would be subject to review by political officers and agencies, as the state board of
canvassers, the legislature in joint convention, and the governor, or, finally, the congress.
But the judicial power of the United States extends to all
cases in law or equity arising under the constitution and laws
of the United States, and this is a case so arising, since the validity of the state law was drawn in question as repugnant to
such constitution and laws, and its validity was sustained.
Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135. And it matters not that the
judgment to be reviewed may be rendered in a proceeding for
mandamus. Hartman v. Greenhaw, 102 U. S. 672.
As we concur with the state court, its judgment has been affirmed; if we had not, its judgment would have been reversed.
In either event, the questions submitted are finally and definitely disposed of by the judgment which we pronounce, and
that judgment is carried into effect by the transmission of our
65
mandate to the state court.
63.
64.
65.

ld. at 280 (emphasis in original).
369 u.s. 215 (1962).
146 u.s. 1, 23-24 (1892).
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The holding in this case was well known to all the Justices and all
the litigants in Bush v. Gore. Only a few days before that decision, the Supreme Court had unanimously relied on dicta in
McPherson when it vacated an earlier decision of the Florida
Supreme Court in a different case arising from the disputed election.66 Nobody could have contended with a straight face that
this holding did not cover Bush v. Gore. And nobody tried.
Amazingly, however, Professor Tribe now contends that
McPherson was not controlling. Here is his argument: McPherson dealt with a pre-election challenge to a state's mode of
choosing electors whereas Bush v. Gore dealt with questions
raised "in the heat of battle." 67 But the opinion in McPherson
contains not the slightest hint of any such distinction.
Even more amazingly, Professor Tribe hints that the distinction he has invented finds support in a different set of precedents. He does this by citing a passage in his own treatise, 68
which compares Gilligan v. Morgan 69 with Scheuer v. Rhodes. 70
But the suggestion is baseless. Gilligan held that the political
question doctrine precluded the issuance of an injunction "requiring initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a
federal court over the training, weaponry and orders of the
[Ohio National] Guard, [because such an injunction would] embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the [federal] Government."71 In the context of Bush v. Gore, an analogous case
would involve "continuing regulatory jurisdiction,"72 over Congress' exercise of its responsibilities under the Twelfth Amendment. Nothing remotely like this was at issue in Bush v. Gore.
Contrary to Professor Tribe's characterization, moreover,
Scheuer did not involve the same "question" that was presented
in Gilligan. 73 Scheuer did not even address any political-question
objection, so it could not and did not suggest any distinction between challenges brought "in advance" and those brought "in
the heat of battle."

66. Bush v. Palm Beach Cry. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
67. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 283 (cited in note 1).
68. See id. at 282-83 & n.455.
69. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
70. 416 u.s. 232 (1974).
71. 413 U.S. at 7 (footnote omitted).
72. !d. at 5.
73. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 283 n.455 (cited in note 1).
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What could Professor Tribe possibly mean when he says
that the Court's "only lawful choice" was to refuse to rule in
Bush v. Gore? Nobody could seriously base such a sweeping and
unequivocal claim on the completely novel distinction by which
he tries to get around the holding in McPherson. The only possibility, I think, is that Professor Tribe must believe that his distinction between challenges brought "in advance" and those
brought "in the heat of battle" is one dictated by the Constitution (though never previously recognized by the Court). That
seems to be the implication of his claim that "the Constitution []
commanded the Court" not to decide this case/4 or as he elsewhere says, that "[t]he requisite textual commitment to a political branch could hardly be clearer." 75
Whatever merit there may be in the notion that the Constitution should be construed to commit the issues raised in Bush v.
Gore exclusively to Congress (an interpretive suggestion that
would require a great deal more elaboration than Professor
Tribe provides), the one thing we know for sure is that the text
of the Constitution does not expressly do any such thing. The
Twelfth Amendment assigns certain tasks to Congress, and Bush
v. Gore did not review Congress' performance of those tasks in
connection with the 2000 election. Nor did the Court claim any
power to do so. There simply is no case law, and no constitutional basis for any case law, that would conflate Supreme Court
review of congressional actions under the Twelfth Amendment
with Supreme Court review of a judicial decision by a subordinate state court. 76
Nowhere in his article does Professor Tribe point to any
"textually demonstrable" commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to review state court judgments for alleged violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with presidential
elections. His assertion that the Constitution "commanded" the
Court to make a single "lawful choice" might best be described
as unsupported. Or, adopting the language that Professor Tribe
74. Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 280 (cited in note 1).
75. Id. at 277-78 (footnotes citing the Twelfth Amendment and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 215 (1962), omitted).
76. For that reason, Professor Tribe's cause is not advanced by his citation of Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 281-82 (cited in note 1).
In that case, the Court refused to overturn an impeachment conviction rendered by the
United States Senate, and the decision would have been relevant to a case in which the
Court was asked to overturn a decision by Congress about the winner of a presidential
election. But such a hypothetical case has nothing to do with Bush v. Gore, which merely
reviewed the validity of a judgment by a subordinate state court.
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uses to attack the Supreme Court, one might say that his assertion does "not fare too well in the 'truth in advertising' department."77
III. WAS THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION A
POINTLESSLY SELF-INFLICTED WOUND BECAUSE
BUSH'S TRIUMPH WAS INEVITABLE?
Amidst the dazzling and intricate argumentation in Professor Tribe's very lengthy commentary on Bush v. Gore, there is a
tantalizing passage in which he argues that Bush would almost
certainly have become President even if the Court had not decided this case in his favor, and that this would have been apparent to the Justices when they decided Bush v. Gore. 78 Professor
Tribe's argument is straightforward: even if Gore had come out
ahead in the Florida court's recount, Florida's Republican legislature or her Republican Secretary of State probably would have
sent Congress the votes from a slate of Bush electors, and Congress probably would have accepted those votes.
This argument is tantalizing because it points in three
somewhat different directions. First, it reinforces Professor
Tribe's entirely appropriate refusal to join the many reckless
commentators who have ascribed partisan motivations to the
Bush v. Gore majority. Second, it tends to confirm Professor
Tribe's claim that Bush v. Gore was part of a pattern of hubristic,
antidemocratic decisions by a Court that has recently developed
the bad habit of inserting itself into matters that ought to be left
to the political process. And third, the argument subtly suggests
that Professor Tribe himself has little reason to be influenced by
partisan bias in his commentary: even if the Court had accepted
the arguments in the briefs he filed, or the (substantially different) arguments that he now advances, Gore probably would not
have become President. Or to put it slightly differently, Professor Tribe probably isn't suffering from what I called "acquired
conviction syndrome" because he doesn't think that the litigation in which he participated could have accomplished the client's goal, even if he had prevailed. In the practically most important sense, this case was always a loser.
Can it really be that all of the intense litigation over Florida's electoral votes was essentially a waste of time because Re77.

78.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 276-77. See also id. at 287.
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publican elected officials were going to put Bush in the White
House no matter what the courts did with Gore's lawsuit? Whatever Professor Tribe may believe, it appears that his co-counsel
believes no such thing. At an academic conference about a year
after the election, Ronald A. Klain was presented by a questioner with essentially the same argument that Professor Tribe
makes here. Mr. Klain answered as follows:
I think it was always our view that if there was a recount in
Florida that was determined to be lawful, consistent with the
Constitution and showed that Al Gore had gotten more votes,
that we really couldn't conceive that someone would take office contrary to that.
Whether it was through Governor Bush withdrawing or
through a judicial proceeding that ordered a retrieval of the
certificates of ascertainments and rival certificates being issued, you know, I just didn't- I never believed that either
candidate, notwithstanding the machinations in the Florida
legislature and everything else that was going on there, was
prepared to take office contrary to the outcome of a recount
that was determined to be legally valid. I just don't think that
would have happened. 79
In my view, Mr. Klain's analysis is clearly right, 80 and it is even
more clear that it was offered in a spirit of candor. If a balanced
evaluation of Bush v. Gore is ever to be written by one of the
disap~ointed litigators in the case, Mr. Klain may be the one to
do it. 1

79. Bush v. Gore: A One Year Retrospective, Federalist Society National Lawyers
Convention, Nov. 17, 2001 (response of Ronald Klain to Professor Todd Zywicki) (transcript available at p. 81 of <http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Engage/OnlineEngage.
pdf>)). Mr. Klain was one of the signatories of Gore's brief in Bush v. Gore, and Professor Tribe has had this to say about his role in the election litigation:
The credit for the strategy and tactics pursued before the county canvassing
boards and in the state courts in the Florida vote-counting contest in fact belongs not solely to David Boies, brilliant strategist and tactician though he is,
but also, and perhaps principally, to Ronald A. Klain, who had been Vice President Gore's extraordinary Chief of Staff in the White House and was his chief
legal counselor during the election and in the recount litigation.
Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 183 n.23 (cited in 1).
80. The validity of his analysis does not depend on the assumption that the recount
ordered by the Florida court would have been conducted in a fair or lawful manner. Cf.
Elhauge, Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again! (cited in note 46).
81. Mr. Klain has published an impressive defense of the Gore team's legal strategy
that does not pretend to be a balanced or disinterested analysis of the Supreme Court's
performance. Ronald A. Klain and Jeremy B. Bash, The Labor of Sisyphus: The Gore
Recount Perspective 157-76, in Larry J. Sabato, ed., Overtime! The Election 2000 Thriller
(Longman Publishers, 2002).
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CONCLUSION
Professor Tribe's commentary on Bush v. Gore exhibits a
very high degree of skill in the arts of persuasion. But admirable
skills can sometimes be used for improper ends. Here, Professor
Tribe's goal is to advance two very grave charges against the Supreme Court. First, he contends that the holding in Bush v. Gore
merits the contemptuously dismissive remark, "EQUAL
PROTECfiON, MY ASS!" Second, he claims that at least five
Justices "have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner
in the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this republic."82 Professor Tribe has simply failed to establish any foundation at all for such serious accusations.
He bases his indictment primarily on two propositions: that
the Court's equal protection analysis is legally untenable, and
that the case in any event raised only nonjusticiable political
questions. As I believe I have shown, both propositions are unsustainable. What's more, Professor Tribe fails to come to grips
with the facts that two of the dissenters in Bush v. Gore agreed
that the Florida court had violated the Equal Protection Clause
(as had three out of seven members of the Florida court itself)
and that none of the dissenters argued that the case was nonjusticiable.
Professor Tribe's verdict is so far over the top that it might
best be explained by reference to the "acquired conviction syndrome" described at the beginning of this paper. But whatever
may explain it, the true House of Mirrors can be found in Professor Tribe's article, not in the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore.

82.

Tribe, 115 Harv. L. Rev. at 290 (cited in 1).

